We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of ‡ow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ‡ow that speci…es a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a target.
Introduction
National security is a public good whose reliable provision reduces economic uncertainty and promotes economic activity. Although the government of a country provides its citizens with national security, the country's security level is not determined only by the government's decision. Non-state actors, as well as other governments, may also a¤ect the country's security level. For example, as a violent non-state actor, a terrorist group can critically a¤ect a country's security level.
In this paper we develop a strategic model of network interdiction. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities; airlines, railroads, pipelines, public transportation, and computer networks are examples of such networks. An adversary is endowed with a bounded quantity of bads; explosives, biochemicals, nuclear weapons, and computer viruses are examples of bads. The adversary chooses a ‡ow that speci…es a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a target. By carrying bads through the network, the adversary can damage the target. Simultaneously, the agency chooses a blockage that speci…es a plan for blocking arcs in the network. By blocking arcs, the agency can decrease the amount of bads carried to the target. However, the blockage of arcs disrupts the operation of the network. The adversary gains and the agency loses from the target damage and the network disruption. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads.
The properties of the Nash equilibria depend on the primitives of the model. When the marginal loss of the target is no greater than the marginal expense of carrying bads, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the adversary carries no bads from the base to the target and the agency blocks no arcs, regardless of the bound on the quantity of bads. When the marginal target loss is greater than the marginal expense, there are various types of Nash equilibria, depending on the marginal target loss, the network and the bound on the quantity of bads. First, if the bound on the quantity of bads is small, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the adversary carries bads from the base to the target up to the bound and the agency blocks no arcs. Second, if the bound on the quantity of bads is large, there are mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which the adversary carries the maximum possible amount of bads through the network with positive probability and the agency blocks no arcs with positive probability. Third, if the bound on the quantity of bads is intermediate, there are mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which the adversary carries bads up to the bound with positive probability and the agency blocks no arcs with positive probability.
In a Nash equilibrium the adversary damages the target if and only if the adversary successfully carries bads from the base to the target and the agency blocks none of the arcs used. By computing the probability of this joint event, we calculate the equilibrium probability of the adversary damaging the target. When the marginal target loss is greater than the marginal expense and the bound on the quantity of bads is either intermediate or large, the equilibrium probabilities can be expressed as negative power functions of the marginal target loss. Assuming constant marginal target loss, we can conclude that the equilibrium probabilities are negative power functions of the target damage. This theoretical …nding is consistent with empirical evidence. 1 This paper contributes to the game theory literature by introducing noncooperative behavior into a KalaiZemel network ‡ow model. Kalai and Zemel [14] de…ne a (transferable utility) cooperative game, called a ‡ow game, in which the worth of a coalition is de…ned as the value of a maximum ‡ow in the network restricted to the members of the coalition. 2 Their main result is that a cooperative ‡ow game is totally balanced and thus has a nonempty core (that is, there are distributions of the total payo¤ of the game that are stable against the formation of coalitions). Our framework di¤ers in that players interact strategically.
Moreover, one might think of the nodes in our game as points in a transportation route or as servers in the Internet rather than as players themselves or locations of players.
This paper also contributes to the literature on network interdiction. Washburn and Wood [18] introduce a zero-sum game between an evader and an interdictor, in which the evader chooses a path to move through a network and the interdictor chooses an arc at which to set up an inspection site. If the evader traverses a path that includes the inspected arc, the evader is detected with some exogenously given positive probability;
otherwise, the evader is not detected. The detection probability of each arc in the network is exogenously
given. Both players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. Given a mixed strategy pro…le, the interdiction probability is de…ned to be the average probability of the evader being detected. The evader aims to minimize the interdiction probability by choosing a path-selection mixed strategy while the interdictor aims to maximize the interdiction probability by choosing an arc-inspection mixed strategy. By using linear programming and network ‡ow techniques, Washburn and Wood [18] …nd Nash equilibria of this game.
Kodialam and Lakshman [15] also introduce a related game of network interdiction in the context of network security. 3 Our model di¤ers from the existing models on network interdiction in four aspects:
(i) Networks are capacitated. That is, a capacity is assigned to each arc in a network.
(ii) The adversary is endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, which may, in equilibrium, be binding.
(iii) The adversary chooses a ‡ow rather than a path. If there are multiple paths in a network, the adversary can choose them at once.
(iv) Our network interdiction game is not a zero-sum game nor even a strictly competitive game.
Because of (i), we do not need to take as given detection probabilities; in our model these probabilities are determined by player behaviors. By virtue of (ii) and (iii), our model has a larger set of strategies for the 1 In empirical research Bohorquez et al. [5] and Clauset et al. [6] show that the fatality distribution of terrorist events follows a power law. 2 For other studies on cooperative ‡ow games, see Kalai and Zemel [13] , Granot and Granot [10] , Potters et al. [16] , and
Reijnierse et al. [17] . 3 Other than these papers, most of the literature on network interdiction deals with an interdictor's optimization problem subject to some budget constraints. See Cormican et al. [7] , Israeli and Wood [11] , and Wood [19] .
adversary than Washburn and Wood [18] . Our consideration of ‡ows rather than paths as in [18] , however, creates a more tractable environment and enables us to obtain sharper characterizations of equilibrium strategies. Because of (iv), we need to use a di¤erent solution technique to …nd equilibria. We exploit the idea that in any Nash equilibrium each player makes rival players indi¤erent between the pure strategies played with positive probability.
We remark that security in network games has attracted signi…cant interest. For example, Ballester et al. [4] study the interaction between players whose payo¤s depend on a network. They obtain a proportional relationship between how much e¤ort a player exerts and how central position the player has in the network.
Baccara and Bar-Isaac [2] study the formation of networks between criminals and terrorists and …nd optimal policies for law enforcement agencies. Baccara and Bar-Isaac [3] further study how the choice of interrogation methods a¤ects the formation of terrorist networks. Goyal and Vigier [9] study the design and protection of networks robust to attacks from outside on the networks'nodes. 4 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a game-theoretic model of network interdiction. Section 3 studies Nash equilibria of the model. Section 4 discusses our theoretical …nding, together with empirical evidence, and also discusses future research topics.
2 The Model
Networks
Let N be a set of nodes with a base node s and a target node t. Let A N N be a set of arcs where each arc is an ordered pair of distinct nodes. Let c := (c ij ) (i;j)2A be a (row) vector of arc capacities where each entry c ij 0 denotes the capacity of arc (i; j). A network is de…ned as a collection G := (N; A; s; t; c).
For each j 2 N , let RS(j) := f(i; j) : (i; j) 2 Ag be the reverse star of node j in network G. For each min-cut theorem. 5 If q c b , however, we have
That is, if the bound quantity is less than or equal to the capacity of a minimum cut blockage, the value of a maximum ‡ow is equal to the bound quantity.
An s t path in network G is a sequence of distinct nodes i 1 ; : : : ; i K such that (i k ; i k+1 ) 2 A for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g with i 1 = s and i K = t. In this case, we say that the s t path includes arcs (i 1 ; i 2 ); : : : ;
A cycle in network G is a sequence of distinct nodes i 1 ; : : : ; i K such that (i k ; i k+1 ) 2 A for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g with (i K ; i 1 ) 2 A. In this case, we say that the cycle includes arcs (i 1 ; i 2 ); : : :
and (i K ; i 1 ). Let H be the set of all s t paths and cycles in network G.
The arc-path-cycle incidence matrix 6 of network G is a matrix M := (m ah ) a2A;h2H with For each (f; b) 2 F B, the net ‡ow to target t under f and b is a (column) vector
In any net ‡ow, all cycles have zero ‡ow and only s t paths have positive ‡ow. Example 1 Let G = (N; A; s; t; c) be a network, where N = fs; i 1 ; i 2 ; tg is a node set with base s and target t, A = f(s; i 1 ); (s; i 2 ); (i 1 ; i 2 ); (i 2 ; t); (t; i 1 )g is an arc set, and c = (c si1 ; c si2 ; c i1i2 ; c i2t ; c ti1 ) = (4; 1; 2; 5; 2)
is an arc capacity vector. Suppose that q = 3. A ‡ow with bound quantity q in network G is given as 
Thus, the net ‡ow to target t under f and b is f b = (1; 0; 1; 1; 0) 0 . As in inequality (10), we have f f b . Figure 1 Each solid circle indicates a node; each arrow indicates an arc; in each pair of numbers, the …rst bold number indicates a ‡ow and the second light number indicates the capacity of an arc.
Players and Strategies
A network G = (N; A; s; t; c) is given. There are two players, say player 1 and player 2. Let player 1 be an adversary and let player 2 be an agency. Suppose that both players move simultaneously.
Player 1 is endowed with a bound quantity q > 0 of bads located at base node s. Player 1 plans to damage target node t and disrupt the operation of network G. Player 1 chooses a plan for carrying bads through network G from base s to target t. Formally, player 1 chooses a ‡ow (of bads) with bound quantity q in network G. Player 1's set of pure strategies is denoted by F, the set of all ‡ows with bound quantity q in network G. For each f 2 F, player 1 carries f ij amount of bads through arc (i; j).
Player 2 aims to protect target t and operate network G e¤ectively. Player 2 chooses a plan for blocking arcs in the network. Formally, player 2 chooses a blockage (of arcs) in network G. Player 2's set of pure strategies is denoted by B, the set of all blockages in network G. For each b 2 B, if b ij = 1, player 2 blocks arc (i; j); otherwise, she does not block the arc.
Players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. Player 1's set of mixed strategies is denoted by (F) and player 2's set of mixed strategies is denoted by (B).
Payo¤s
The net ‡ow to the target determines how severely the target is damaged. If player 1 chooses a ‡ow f and player 2 chooses a blockage b, then f b is the net ‡ow to target t under f and b.
vector of target losses where each entry`i j denotes the target damage caused by one unit of bads carried through arc (i; j). We assume that`i t =`t > 0 for each (i; t) 2 RS(t) and`i j = 0 for each (i; j) = 2 RS(t).
We call`t the marginal target loss. For each (f; b) 2 F B, the target damage amounts tò
Then player 1 gains` f b while player 2 loses the same amount.
By blocking arcs, player 2 decreases the net ‡ow of bads to the target. However, the blockage of arcs disrupts the operation of network G. The capacity of the arc blockage determines how severely the network is disrupted. For each b 2 B, the network disruption amounts to
Then player 1 gains c b while player 2 loses the same amount.
Player 1 incurs the expense of carrying bads from the base to the target. Let e := (e ij ) (i;j)2A be a (row)
vector with e si = 1 for each (s; i) 2 F S(s) and e ij = 0 for each (i; j) = 2 F S(s). For each f 2 F, the expense of carrying bads amounts to
Player 2 obtains a constant worth w 0 while operating network G.
For each (f; b) 2 F B, the payo¤ of player 1 is de…ned as
and the payo¤ of player 2 is de…ned as
, the expected payo¤ s of the players are
Let := (G; q; (F); (B); u 1 ; u 2 ) be a network interdiction game.
Nash Equilibria of the Model
A network interdiction game is given as = (G; q; (F); (B); u 1 ; u 2 ). We use Nash equilibrium as our solution concept. In a Nash equilibrium, no player can be (strictly) better o¤ by changing his or her strategy. 
Depending on whether the marginal target loss is greater than one, we consider two cases. Suppose …rst that the marginal target loss is less than or equal to one.
A ‡ow f 2 F is a trivial ‡ow if e f = 0. In any trivial ‡ow, all s t paths have zero ‡ow. Thus, the net ‡ow to the target under any trivial ‡ow f and any blockage b is the zero ‡ow. That is, for each b 2 B,
We call (f ; b o ) a trivial- ‡ow zero-blockage strategy pro…le. If the marginal target loss is less than or equal to one, player 1, the adversary, does not have an incentive to carry bads from the base to the target and player 2, the agency, does not have an incentive to block arcs. Thus, we have the following proposition.
is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B. Notice that Proposition 1 holds regardless of the bound quantity. We provide an example of trivial- ‡ow zero-blockage Nash equilibria.
Example 2 Consider network G in Example 1. Suppose that bound quantity q is any positive real number.
A trivial ‡ow is given as f = (0; 0; 2; 2; 2) 0 . See Figure 2 . Suppose that`t 1. From Proposition 1, strategy
is a Nash equilibrium of the network interdiction game. In this Nash equilibrium, player 1 carries no bads from the base to the target and player 2 blocks no arcs. Figure 2 The bold numbers indicate the trivial ‡ow.
Now suppose that the marginal target loss is greater than one. Then player 1 has the incentive to carry bads from the base to the target. Thus, any trivial- ‡ow zero-blockage strategy pro…le is not a Nash equilibrium. To study Nash equilibria in this case, we divide into three subcases, depending on the marginal target loss, the capacity of a minimum cut blockage, and the bound quantity. The bound quantity q is small 
We …rst study the subcase when`t > 1 and q
that is, the value of a binding ‡ow is equal to the bound quantity. We call (f ; b o ) a binding- ‡ow zeroblockage strategy pro…le. If the marginal target loss is greater than one and the bound quantity is small, player 1, the adversary, has an incentive to carry bads from the base to the target up to the bound quantity but player 2, the agency, does not have the incentive to block arcs. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If`t > 1 and q (1=`t)c b , any binding- ‡ow zero-blockage strategy pro…le (f ; b o ) is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B. We provide an example of binding- ‡ow zeroblockage Nash equilibria.
Example 3 Consider network G in Example 1. Note that the acyclic maximum ‡ow is f = (2; 1; 2; 3; 0) 0 and that the minimum cut blockage is b = (0; 1; 1; 0; 0) 0 . The capacity of the minimum cut blockage is c b = 3. Suppose that`t = 2 and q = 1. Then the binding ‡ow is f = (2=3; 1=3; 2=3; 1; 0) 0 . See Figure   3 . From Proposition 2, strategy pro…le (f ; b o ) is a Nash equilibrium of the network interdiction game. In this Nash equilibrium, player 1 carries bads from the base to the target up to the bound quantity but player 2 does not block any arc.
Figure 3
The bold numbers indicate the binding ‡ow.
We next study the subcase when`t > 1 and c b < q. Recall that f is an acyclic maximum ‡ow with large bound quantity q in network G. A mixed strategy 1 2 (F) is a max- ‡ow strategy for player 1 if 1 (f ) = 1 1=`t and 1 (f ) = 1=`t. A mixed strategy 2 2 (B) is a min-cut strategy for player 2 if 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t. We call ( 1 ; 2 ) a max- ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le. We provide max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria of the network interdiction game.
Proposition 3 If`t > 1 and c b < q, any max- ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix B.
Here we show that given a min-cut strategy 2 , player 1 is indi¤erent between f and f , and that given a max- ‡ow strategy 1 , player 2 is indi¤erent between b o and b . In any max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium,
, and (f ; b ) are assigned positive probability. Figure 4 illustrates the players' payo¤s for these strategy pro…les. The calculation of these payo¤s can be found in the proof of Proposition 3. Because 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t, player 1's expected payo¤ for (f ; 2 ) is calculated as
Thus, u 1 (f ; 2 ) = u 1 (f ; 2 ). That is, by choosing a min-cut strategy 2 , player 2 makes player 1 indi¤erent between f and f . Because 1 (f ) = 1 1=`t and 1 (f ) = 1=`t, player 2's expected payo¤ for
For
Thus, In any max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the game, player 1 gains a payo¤ of (1 1=`t)c b and player 2 gains w c b . That is, u 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) = (1 1=`t)c b and u 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = w c b . Thus, any two max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria are payo¤ equivalent.
In any max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the network interdiction game, player 1, the adversary, chooses a trivial ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = 1 1=`t and chooses an acyclic maximum ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = 1=`t. That is, player 1 carries no bads from the base to the target with probability 1 1=`t and carries the maximum possible amount of bads through the network with probability 1=`t. In this equilibrium, player 2, the agency, chooses the zero blockage b o with probability 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and chooses a minimum cut blockage b with probability 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t. That is, player 2 blocks no arcs with probability 1=`t and blocks all the arcs necessary to disconnect the target from the base with probability
In any max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, we can calculate the probability of the adversary damaging the target. Note that in this equilibrium, player 1 damages the target if and only if player 1 carries the maximum amount of bads and player 2 blocks no arcs. This joint event takes place with probability (1=`t)(1=`t) =` 2 t . Thus, in any max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the probability of the adversary damaging the target is
We provide an example of max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria. A mixed strategy 1 2 (F) is a -scaled max- ‡ow strategy, or simply a - ‡ow strategy, for player 1 if for some 2 [1=`t; 1], 1 (f ) = 1 1= `t and 1 ( f ) = 1= `t. Note that any - ‡ow strategy with = 1 is a max- ‡ow strategy. We call ( 1 ; 2 ) a - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le. We present - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria of the network interdiction game.
Proposition 4 If`t > 1 and c b < q, any - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix B.
In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the network interdiction game, player 1 gains a payo¤ of (1 1=`t)c b and player 2 gains w c b . That is, u 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) = (1 1=`t)c b and u 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = w c b .
Thus, any two - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria are payo¤ equivalent.
In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the game, player 1, the adversary, chooses a trivial ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = 1 1= `t and chooses a ‡ow f with probability 1 ( f ) = 1= `t.
Player 2, the agency, chooses the zero blockage b o with probability 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and chooses a minimum cut blockage b with probability 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t. Note that in this equilibrium, player 1 damages the target if and only if player 1 chooses f and player 2 chooses b o . This joint event takes place with probability (1= `t)(1=`t) = (1= )` 2 t . Thus, in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the probability of the adversary damaging the target is (1= )` 2 t . In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if the adversary damages the target, the target damage amounts to` ( f ) and`t = (1= ) (1=(c b ) )T D , we have
where 2 (1=`t; 1]. Thus, in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium with 2 (1=`t; 1], the probability of the adversary damaging the target is a negative power function of the target damage. In addition, if = (`t)
for some 2 [0; 1), equality (21) can be rewritten as
because p = (`t) 2 and`t = (c b )
. However, if = 1=`t, the equilibrium probability is independent of the target damage, because p =` We …nally study the subcase when`t > 1 and (1=`t)c b < q c b . Recall that f is a binding ‡ow. A mixed strategy 1 2 (F) is a - ‡ow strategy for player 1 if 1 (f ) = 1 (1=`t)((c b )=q) and 1 (f ) = (1=`t)((c b )=q). We call ( 1 ; 2 ) a - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le. We provide - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria of the network interdiction game.
Proposition 5 If`t > 1 and (1=`t)c b < q c b , any - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 5 is presented in Appendix B.
Here we show that given a min-cut strategy 2 , player 1 is indi¤erent between f and f , and that given a - ‡ow strategy 1 , player 2 is indi¤erent between b o and b . In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium,
, and (f ; b ) are assigned positive probability. Figure 6 illustrates the players' payo¤s for these strategy pro…les. The calculation of these payo¤s can be found in the proof of Proposition 5. Because 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t, player 1's expected payo¤ for (f ; 2 ) is calculated as
Thus, u 1 (f ; 2 ) = u 1 (f ; 2 ). That is, by choosing a min-cut strategy 2 , player 2 makes player 1 indi¤erent between f and f . Because 1 (f ) = 1 (1=`t)((c b )=q) and 1 (f ) = (1=`t)((c b )=q), player 2's expected
For ( 1 ; b ), player 2's expected payo¤ is
Thus, In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the game, player 1 gains a payo¤ of (1 1=`t)c b and player 2 gains w c b . That is, u 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) = (1 1=`t)c b and u 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = w c b . Thus, any two - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria are payo¤ equivalent.
In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the network interdiction game, player 1, the adversary, chooses a trivial ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = 1 (1=`t)((c b )=q) and chooses a binding ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = (1=`t)((c b )=q). That is, player 1 carries no bads from the base to the target with probability 1 (1=`t)((c b )=q) and carries the bound quantity of bads with probability (1=`t)((c b )=q).
In this equilibrium, player 2, the agency, chooses the zero blockage b o with probability 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and chooses a minimum cut blockage b with probability 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t. That is, player 2 blocks no arcs with probability 1=`t and blocks all the arcs necessary to disconnect the target from the base with probability
In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, we can calculate the probability of the adversary damaging the target. Note that in this equilibrium, player 1 damages the target if and only if player 1 carries the bound quantity of bads and player 2 blocks no arcs. This joint event takes place with probability ((c b )=q)` 2 t . Thus, in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the probability of the adversary damaging the target is
We provide an example of - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria. A mixed strategy 1 2 (F) is a - ‡ow strategy for player 1 if for some 2 [(1=`t)((c b )=q); 1], 1 (f ) = 1 (1= `t)((c b )=q) and 1 ( f ) = (1= `t)((c b )=q). Note that any - ‡ow strategy with = 1 is a - ‡ow strategy. We call ( 1 ; 2 ) a - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le. We present - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria of the network interdiction game.
Proposition 6 If`t > 1 and (1=`t)c b < q c b , any - ‡ow min-cut strategy pro…le ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of network interdiction game .
The proof of Proposition 6 is presented in Appendix B.
In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ) of the game, player 1, the adversary, chooses a trivial ‡ow f with probability 1 (f ) = 1 (1= `t)((c b )=q) and chooses a ‡ow f with probability 1 ( f ) = (1= `t)((c b )=q). Player 2, the agency, chooses the zero blockage b o with probability 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and chooses a minimum cut blockage b with probability 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t. Note that in this equilibrium, player 1 damages the target if and only if player 1 chooses f and player 2 chooses b o . This joint event takes place with probability (1= )((c b )=q)` 2 t . Thus, in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the probability of the adversary damaging the target is (1= )((c b )=q)` 2 t . In any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if the adversary damages the target, the target damage amounts to` ( f ) b o = ( `t)q. Let T D := ( `t)q denote the target damage in a - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium.
Let p := (1= )((c b )=q)` 2 t denote the probability of the adversary damaging the target in a - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium. Because p = (1= )((c b )=q)` 2 t and`t = (1= )(1=q)T D , we have
where 2 ((1=`t)((c b )=q); 1]. Thus, in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium with 2 ((1=`t)((c b )=q); 1], the probability of the adversary damaging the target is a negative power function of the target damage. In addition, if = (q=(c b )) (`t) for some 2 [0; 1), equality (27) can be rewritten as
, the equilibrium probability is independent of the target damage, because p =` In summary, the Nash equilibria of the network interdiction game depend on the marginal target loss, the capacity of a minimum cut blockage, and the bound quantity. When the marginal target loss is less than or equal to one, we …nd trivial- ‡ow zero-blockage Nash equilibria. When the marginal target loss is greater than one and the bound quantity is small, we …nd binding- ‡ow zero-blockage Nash equilibria. When the marginal target loss is greater than one and the bound quantity is large, we …nd - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria. Thus, we can view max- ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria as a special case of - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria. When the marginal target loss is greater than one and the bound quantity is intermediate, we …nd - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria. We can then view - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria as a special case of - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibria.
When the marginal target loss is greater than one and the bound quantity is either intermediate or large, the equilibrium probabilities of the adversary damaging the target can be expressed as negative power functions of the target damage. In the following section we discuss our theoretical …nding together with empirical evidence.
Discussion
We …rst relate our results to some empirical studies of terrorist events and then discuss related research in progress and further directions.
Fatality Distribution of Terrorist Events
Let z denote the number of fatalities in a terrorist event and let p(z) denote the frequency of a terrorist event in which the number of fatalities is z. The fatality distribution of terrorist events follows a power law if for each z z min , p(z) / z where z min and are the parameters of the distribution. The estimates of the parameters are derived from data and denoted byẑ min and^ .
Recent empirical studies show that the fatality distribution of terrorist events follows a power law. Clauset et al. [6] use the database of National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and conclude that the fatality distribution follows a power law. The estimate of the scaling parameter is^ = 2:38.
Bohorquez et al. [5] construct a data set on insurgent wars and conclude that for each insurgent war the fatality distribution follows a power law. The estimates of the scaling parameter are clustered around 2:5.
Recall that in any - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium with = (`t) for some 2 [0; 1), the probability of the adversary damaging the target, p , is a negative power function of the target damage T D . Precisely, from equality (22), we have
which can be rewritten as
To link this theoretical …nding and empirical evidence we make two additional assumptions. Suppose that the target damage is measured by the number of fatalities and that the probability of the adversary damaging the target is proportional to the frequency of a terrorist event.
Now suppose that the estimate of the scaling parameter,^ 2, is derived from data. By setting^ =^ 2 1 and solving for^ , we have^ =^ 2 1 . Notice that^ 2 [0; 1). Therefore, in the - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium with = (`t) ^ , the fatality distribution is predicted to be
and is consistent with data. Similarly, in the - ‡ow min-cut Nash equilibrium with = (q=(c b ))
^ , is consistent with data.
Further Research
This paper presents a strategic model of network interdiction in which two players, an adversary and an agency, have complete information and simultaneously choose their strategies. Building on this research a further approach is to assume that the players have incomplete information about each other's strategies and payo¤s and about the sources and targets; the agency may not know the adversary's type -its feasible strategies, its payo¤s, the sources of the bads and also their targets. The extension to incomplete information is, in our view, of clear importance. (It may also be interesting to have more than two players.) An alternative approach is to assume that the players sequentially choose their strategies. The agency may observe the adversary's choice of strategy and choose her own strategy conditional on this observation or, alternatively, the agency may move …rst in setting up a security system. Both these approaches are subjects of our current and future planned research.
Appendix A
In this appendix we provide the ‡ow decomposition algorithm. 7 A network is given as G = (N; A; s; t; c).
For each f 2 F, we can …nd a vector x = (x h ) 0 h2H such that f = M x by using the ‡ow decomposition algorithm. Initially we are given a ‡ow f and the zero vector x. At each step of the algorithm, we construct a sequence of distinct nodes, and obtain either an s t path or a cycle. We then update vector x and ‡ow f . This algorithm terminates when the updated ‡ow is the zero ‡ow.
Algorithm 1 Flow Decomposition
Let f = (f ij ) 0 (i;j)2A 2 F be given. We set x = (x h ) 0 h2H = 0, the vector of zeros. At Step k = 1; 2; : : : ; if f is the zero ‡ow, this algorithm terminates and yields vector x. If f is not the zero ‡ow, there is an arc (i; j) 2 A with f ij > 0.
(i) We start from base s. If there is (i 1 ; i 2 ) 2 A with i 1 = s and f i1i2 > 0, beginning with the two nodes i 1 ; i 2 we begin the construction of a sequence of distinct nodes with the two nodes i 1 and i 2 . If there is (i 2 ; i 3 ) 2 A with f i2i3 > 0, we add node i 3 to the sequence. Repeat this until we add target t or a previously added node to the sequence. In the former case, an s t path is obtained and, in the latter case, a cycle is obtained. We denote the outcome by h 2 H. We replace x h = 0 with the minimum ‡ow of the arcs included in h. We then replace f ij with f ij x h if h includes (i; j). We proceed to the next step.
(ii) If there is no (i 1 ; i 2 ) 2 A with i 1 = s and f i1i2 > 0, we …nd another arc (i; j) with f ij > 0. We start from node i. By applying the argument in (i), we obtain a cycle and update vector x and ‡ow f . We proceed to the next step.
Appendix B
A network interdiction game is given as = (G; q; (F); (B); u 1 ; u 2 ). We start from the following lemmas.
Proof. Since f b is the net ‡ow to the target under ‡ow f and blockage b, only s t paths have positive ‡ow.
Thus,
Proof. Since f b is the net ‡ow to the target under ‡ow f and blockage b, only s t paths have positive ‡ow. This implies that
Proof. Because f 
From Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we deduce the following.
Lemma 4
If f is an acyclic maximum ‡ow with large bound quantity q in network G, then e f = (1=`t)` f . Furthermore, if f is a binding ‡ow, it holds that e f = (1=`t)` f .
Proof.
Note that e (f )
e f = (1=`t)` f . Now multiplying both sides by q=(c b ), we have (q=(c b ))e f = (1=`t)(q=(c b ))` f .
Because f is a binding ‡ow, f = (q=(c b ))f . Because e f = (q=(c b ))e f and` f = (q=(c b ))` f ,
we have e f = (1=`t)` f .
Lemma 5
If f is an acyclic maximum ‡ow with large bound quantity q in network G, then e f = v f .
Furthermore, if f is a binding ‡ow, it holds that e f = v f .
Proof. Note that e (f ) Proof. Note that for each b 2 B, (1=`t)` (f )
We now present the proofs of the propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that`t 1. We show that no player can be (strictly) better o¤ by
o from Lemma 1, and`t 1, if player 1 chooses any ‡ow f , his payo¤ is calculated as
Thus, player 1 cannot be better o¤. If player 2 chooses any blockage b, her payo¤ is calculated as Since (f )
e f from Lemma 4, e f = v f from Lemma 5,
The last equality comes from equality (16) . Similarly,
If player 1 chooses any ‡ow f , his payo¤ is calculated as 
because` f c b +` (f ) b from Lemma 6,` f = (`t)e f from Lemma 4, e f = v f from Lemma 5. Note that the last equality comes from equality (16) . Thus, player 2 cannot be better o¤. Therefore,
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that`t > 1 and c b < q. To show that ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of , it su¢ ces to show that (i)
o and e f = 0,
Because (f ) b = f o and e f = 0,
Because (f ) b o = f and` f = (`t)e f from Lemma 4,
The last equality comes from Lemma 5 and equality (15) . Because (f ) b = f o and e f = v f from Lemma 5,
The last equality comes from equality (15) . Then, as in (17), player 1's expected payo¤ for (f ; 2 ) is
(ii) We show that
The last equality comes from Lemma 5 and equality (15) .
Then, as in (19) , player 2's expected payo¤ for
(iii) We show that for each f 2 F, u 1 (f ; 2 ) u 1 (f; 2 ). For each f 2 F, we calculate player 1's payo¤s.
Then, for each f 2 F,
Note that the last equality comes from Lemma 1. From (i),
(iv) We show that for each b 2 B, u 2 ( 1 ; b o ) u 2 ( 1 ; b). For each b 2 B, we calculate player 2's payo¤s.
because 1 (f ) = 1 1=`t and 1 (f ) = 1=`t. Note that the last inequality comes from Lemma 6. Because (1=`t)` f = e f and e f = c b , we have u 2 ( 1 ; b) w c b . From (ii), we know that u 2 ( 1 ; b o ) = w c b .
. This proves that ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of .
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that`t > 1 and c b < q. To show that ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of , it su¢ ces to show that (i)
Because 2 (b o ) = 1=`t and 2 (b ) = 1 1=`t, player 1's expected payo¤ for ( f ; 2 ) is
From part (i) of the proof of Proposition 3, we have 
Because 1 (f ) = 1 1= `t and 1 ( f ) = 1= `t, player 2's expected payo¤ for
Also, player 2's expected payo¤ for
(iii) This is already shown in part (iii) of the proof of Proposition 3.
From part (iv) of the proof of Proposition 3, we have
Note that the last inequality comes from Lemma 6. Because (1=`t)` f = e f and e f = c b ,
Therefore, ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of .
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that`t > 1 and (1=`t)c b < q c b . To show that ( 1 ; 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of , it su¢ ces to show that (i)
The last equality comes from Lemma 5 and equality (16) . Because (f ) b = f o and e f = v f from Lemma 5,
The last equality comes from equality (16) . Then, as in (23), player 1's expected payo¤ for (f ; 2 ) is u 1 (f ; 2 ) = (1 1=`t)c b . As in (24), player 1's expected payo¤ for (f ; 2 ) is u 1 (f ; 2 ) = (1 1=`t)c b .
Thus, u 1 (f ; 2 ) = u 1 (f ; 2 ).
(ii) We show that u 2 ( (i) We show that u 1 (f ; 2 ) = u 1 ( f ; 2 ). Calculate player 1's expected payo¤ for ( f ; 2 ). Because Because 1 (f ) = 1 (1= `t)((c b )=q) and 1 ( f ) = (1= `t)((c b )=q), player 2's expected payo¤ for 
